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Abstract
Within the past ten years, Russian election interference has escalated, affecting multiple countries
across Europe as well as in the United States. The European Union’s (EU) Common Foreign
Security Policy (CFSP) was created with the intention to promote international peace and security,
however in its current state it cannot address the spread of disinformation that is taking place today.
Particularly in Eastern Europe, the amount of interference from Russian media that is taking place
is a threat to security, both on a national and EU level. In this paper, we seek to determine to what
extent Russian disinformation and election interference has affected European security, and to a
larger extent, the world. To do this, we examine cases from Eastern, Central, and Western Europe.
Based on the study of trends in disinformation campaigns promoted by Russia, the paper provides
an analysis of the CFSP and its shortcomings, particularly regarding the increase of disinformation
on a global level.
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Introduction
Within the past ten years, election interference has escalated, affecting many countries
across Europe and in the United States (U.S.). This shows that although it has been recurring
across different democratic elections globally, the exact definition is still unclear. The 2016 U.S.
elections served as a benchmark case in recognizing modern election interference; specifically,
the use of social media to influence voters and spread false information. In recent years, there
have been multiple instances of interference in the other smaller scale, national European
elections. (Gilles 2019) An important question in this case study is why is the Russian
government interfering in European elections? How will this interference benefit Russia’s
agenda and to what extent has this impacted the security of Europe, and to a larger extent, the
world?
The newest focus of Russian efforts to interfere in elections appears to be on the Balkans
and West European elections, but hybrid activities in the Western and Central Europe, Ukraine,
and other countries globally also persist. The European Union itself has also been the subject of a
disinformation campaign from the Kremlin, acting to discredit the democratic validity of the
institution. The Russian government values cyber activity as a key role in how the government
and military operates. They have established troll farms across Russia that exist purely to spread
disinformation across different social media platforms. These troll farms have immense amounts
of funding from the Russian military; they are constantly putting out new false information
intended to disrupt democratic elections across Europe and the world. Within the evolution of
cyber activity, the Russian approach to the relationship between information warfare and a
traditional state of war is interesting because of the relationship between peace and military
action. According to an analysis conducted in 2011, the divide between war and peace can be
conveniently broken down in cyberspace. This damage, particularly the spread of disinformation
through different media platforms, can be done to an adversary without formally crossing the
line between war and peace. (Gilles 2019)
According to the Rand Corporation, Russia spreads propaganda to Russian speakers in
the Baltic states, Ukraine, and other nearby states through a variety of means, including
traditional and social media. Particularly in Eastern Europe, Russia has used this outreach to
inspire dissent against neighboring governments, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
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(NATO) and the European Union (EU). These information operations, which bring back the
Soviet-era “active measures,” appear to be an increasing priority within the Kremlin, as it spent
over $1.1 billion on media disinformation campaigns and troll farms in 2014, increasing its
spending on foreign-focused media in 2015. The Kremlin’s social media campaigns intertwined
with its information operations that involve traditional media, because of traditional news stories
being crafted and disseminated online. (Todd C. Helmus, Bodine-Baron and Radin 2018)
The hybrid war tactics that Russia uses today, however, are not closely related to those
used during the Cold War. Even if Russia had similar information operations previously than
they have access to today, the tactics have evolved dramatically. The volume and ambition of
Russian information campaigns today are assisted by the existence of the internet, news sites,
and social media, which didn’t exist twenty years ago. Using cyber operations is also fairly new.
Russia’s evolved use of cyber and information technology to gather and use information to
influence who they wish is astounding. Because Russia and the world are much more closely
interlinked than they were during the Cold War in terms of partnerships and treaties, and the
internet, it is faster and easier for Russia to penetrate Western societies. (Gilles 2019)
Europe has found that it is difficult to prevent interference and foreign meddling
operations, as there is a functional grey zone where these operations take place. This makes it
more difficult to attribute responsibility to one specific government agency. For example,
Russia’s military intelligence agency is responsible for the gathering of information and digital
spying, however other criminal groups and hacking collectives are responsible for the
development and deploying of the malware that is used in election hacking. The relation between
these groups is difficult to distinguish, making it difficult to know who specifically is carrying
out these attacks. This is done intentionally, ensuring that Russia cannot be pinpointed for their
interference. Russia’s social media disinformation campaign is formidable. Before the Italian
election in March 2018, evidence shows that bots were responsible for 15 percent of Twitter
activity promoting far-right and populist candidates. The goal of these bots is to create a trend
that becomes a headline, influencing more and more people to believe in a cause or a candidate.
(Chertoff and Rasmussen 2019)
This paper seeks to understand to what extent Russia has influenced Europe’s elections
through disinformation campaigns, and what their goal is in doing so. How does this impact
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European security, and what can Europe do to defend themselves against these
interference campaigns?

Methodology
This paper analyzes the competence of Europe’s Common Foreign Security policy and
how it may hinder future defense policies of the European Union, particularly regarding the
growing need to address Russia’s increased disinformation efforts in Europe. This paper uses
intra-case analysis to review different cases of disinformation and election interference within
the European Union. Using both primary sources and peer-reviewed secondary sources, it has
been possible to grasp the range of Russian interference in the Balkan states and Western
Europe. When comparing Eastern Europe to Central and Western Europe, Russia used regional
and cultural differences to their benefit, pitting these differences against each other, creating
divisions. What these countries had in common, however, was an overarching theme of anti-EU
and anti-NATO sentiment. Although through slightly different techniques, Russia uses the same
rhetoric and techniques in the Eastern Bloc as it does in Western states, with the same aim of
creating a polarized and weakened Europe.

Literature Review
This paper will now turn to existing literature regarding the European Union’s Common
Foreign Security Policy and Russia’s spread of disinformation and explain how my research will
fit into existing literature. As stated at the beginning of the paper, election interference and
disinformation has increased over the years, calling into question the functionality of the CFSP.
The European Union (EU) has become more involved in finding methods to combat the
destabilization challenges in cyber activity, such as disinformation and cyberattacks. The EU’s
response to these hybrid threats can be analyzed by two different policy instruments. The first
one, according to Giumelli, Cusumano, and Besana, is that the EU has responded by using its
soft power. Soft power involves the ability to influence governments or states without the use
or threat of force. This use of soft power has been increasingly adopted by the EU since 2015 in
response to misinformation campaigns. The second type is a more traditional, “hard action” that
involves the implementation of sanctions and other restrictive measures. Strategic
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communication and sanctions are important aspects of countering hybrid threats imposed by
Russian media. Policy instruments, such as sanctions and other strict restrictive measures,
require especially close cooperation among military and civilian actors. The authors state that
strategic communications and sanctions are the most necessary parts of the EU’s responses to
these emerging hybrid threats and the importance of a common, comprehensive approach to
countering them. (Francesco Giumelli 2017)
According to research conducted by Margaret Taylor, European democracies have faced
foreign interference in their elections for years, and the primary threat has always been Russia. In
the early 2000s, when President Vladimir Putin merged his power in Russia and became the
president, he turned his attention to focus on the former states of the Soviet Union and the former
Communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe. He intended to pull those countries away
from Western-style democracy and encourage them to return to Russia’s powerful sphere of
influence. He began his campaign of anti-Western democracy here, in an attempt to pull these
Balkan states back into the sphere of Russia. After many of these countries joined the European
Union and solidified their standing as democratic nations, President Putin shifted his focus
towards weakening NATO and the EU. He began disinformation campaigns intended to discredit
politicians and democratic institutions, such as free and fair elections and independent media.
(Taylor 2019)
In 2019, President Putin made his opinions on Western-style democracy very clear,
stating that “The liberal idea” or the dominant western ideology since the end of World War II
which includes things like multiculturalism, the rule of law, and respect for human rights—has
“become obsolete” and “outlived its purpose.” Putin intends to weaken democracy across
Europe, and the world, by installing similarly thinking political allies in the highest ranks of
government across Europe. By supporting far-right and nationalist parties and leaders, he has the
power to influence European democracy and further his goal of establishing Russia as a global
power. (Taylor 2019)
The impact of Russia’s disinformation operations globally is difficult to measure.
Russia’s information campaigns appear both modern and sophisticated; pushing boundaries of
the digital age, and reminiscent of the old school active measures used in the Soviet era. Social
media is the most prominent use of spreading disinformation. In 2017, Russia had exploited
Facebook as part of its information campaign for the 2016 United States (US) election.
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Through the Internet Research Agency, Russia created multiple Facebook pages that
were created with the intention to exploit and expand certain social divisions within the United
States that included racial tensions, religion, political affiliation, and class. (Todd C. Helmus,
2018) These pages used Facebook’s advertising algorithms to target the ads to specific regions
and groups that were viewed as most vulnerable to the intended message. Russia created a
“Blacktivist” page, an extreme version of the Black Lives Matter movement that intended to
divide the already vulnerable democratic party. Posts on this page incited violence and
encouraged voters to resort to whatever means necessary to defend themselves against the
“corrupt criminal justice system.” Another example is the page “Being Patriotic,” which intended
to rally Americans against refugee populations seeking asylum in the United States. It also
posted attempts to dupe audiences into believing that federal employees were seizing land from
private property owners. These posts intended to create a divide between citizens not only among
each other, but also between them and their government, inciting anger at how they were
supposedly being treated. (Taylor 2019)

EU Action and Europe’s CFSP
In May 2019, ahead of the EU’s elections, Europe was doing everything in its power to
prevent the spread of disinformation over the internet and stop election hacking from taking
place. Security experts claimed that there had been attempted interference in months before the
election. There has been a sudden rise in Russian state-sponsored hacking against European
governments in the past months. The rise of nationalist and populist groups across Europe,
particularly the Eastern Bloc, has increased the potential for Russia’s disinformation efforts
through social media outlets. The European Union does not have its own intelligence service and
instead relies on the national government to provide information. It is important to note that the
hackers in the Russian government work mostly as an intelligence agency for Russia, so they are
gathering geopolitical data and sharing information with the Kremlin. (Foy, Murgia and Peel
2019)
These actions, and the implications that came with Russia’s interference, forced the
European Union to reevaluate its common foreign and security policies. The European Union
established the Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) to preserve peace, strengthen security,
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promote international cooperation and development. It was also intended to merge democracy,
and the rule of law, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms into the CFSP,
promoting western ideals on a global level. (European Parliament 2018) The Common Foreign
Security Policy was originally established in the Amsterdam Treaty as a Europe wide alternative
to NATO. Two separate pillars created for justice and home affairs policies and the Common
Foreign and Security Policy rarely generate true legislation. Decision-making within both of
these policies is intergovernmental and unanimity is required to pass votes for almost
everything. (European Parliament 2018)
This treaty became re-worked into the Lisbon Treaty of 2007, the most recent treaty
outlining the fundamental workings of the EU. According to the Treaty provisions, creation of a
European External Action Service (EEAS) is the first step before they can enforce a real foreign
policy and establish a High Representative. The High Representative regularly consults
Parliament on the principal aspects and the choices of the CFSP to inform Parliament on the
evolution of policies. This means that the Parliament’s opinions and thoughts are an important
factor in this decision making. Parliament holds bi-annual debates on the CFSP and CSDP based
on annual progress reports. Questions and recommendations are then posed to the Council or the
High Representative. (Troszcynska-VanGenderen 2016)
The problem with the CFSP, however, is that the EU, instead of attempting to improve
relations with its external suppliers through transparency, left it to the member states to act
accordingly. The European Union has made many attempts to reform the existing voting
procedures, which could facilitate a more common and civil agreement, however member states
have been reluctant to give up this feature, claiming it is their national and sovereign right. (Foy,
Murgia and Peel 2019) The Treaty of Lisbon kept the use of Quality Majority Voting (QMV), or
majority by two-thirds, in some circumstances. Primarily, when the European Council has
reached a unanimous decision relating to the EU’s “strategic interests and objectives,” the
Council can use QMV to make decisions based on a unanimous decision made on the first round
of decisions. (Foy, Murgia and Peel 2019) There is a safety measure that has been built into
Article 31(2) Treaty on the European Union (TEU), allowing a Member State to call up national
policy, a decision by unanimous vote by the European Council. (Wagnsson and Hellman 2018)
Because the CFSP is intergovernmental, the regular jurisdiction of the European Court
does not apply. However, even without any legal obligation to act under the treaty, the political
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obligation still stands. The difficulty of upholding the treaty is that the larger Member States do
not have much to fear from political sanctions. The Commission and European Parliament have
very limited roles in CFSP. The European Parliament has a right to consult on the main aspects
and basic choices of CFSP, but the Council is not typically obliged to consider its views.
(Archick 2018)
The CFSP in its current state is not strong enough to combat the election fraud and spread
of disinformation that has taken place globally. In countries such as France and the United
Kingdom (UK), the rise of populist far-right parties can, and has, created many difficult
situations for the European Union. In the 2016 “Brexit” referendum, Russian bots and Twitter
accounts played a large role in the decision making of the citizens of the UK. Russia’s goal of a
de-unified Europe with leaders that will allow Putin to have a global influence is becoming more
of a possibility. (politics.co.uk 2018)
In its current state, the CFSP has established five goals of the EEAS: first; the EU intends
to fully implement the Minsk agreement, as this is a key element of any substantial change
possible among the EU and Russia. The second goal is to strengthen relations with the EU’s
Eastern partners, particularly Central Asia. Third, the European Union must strengthen its
internal EU resilience, especially regarding hybrid threats and strategic communication. The
fourth principle is the need for engagement with Russia, both on foreign policy issues, especially
Iran, Syria, or the Middle East Peace Process, but also migration, counter-terrorism, and climate
change. (Euractiv 2012) It is also very important to focus on other areas where there is an
identifiable EU interest. This relates to the fifth principle, which elaborates on the necessity of
willingness of member states to support the Russian civil society while engaging and investing in
contracts and exchanges. (Euractiv 2012)
Three of the EU's regimes of restrictive measures, including travel bans, asset freezes
on individuals and entities, and economic measures, will be subject to review in the coming
year. The EU has also emphasized the need to challenge Russia’s ongoing disinformation
campaigns. The current CFSP is not strong enough in its capabilities, especially because of the
unanimity clause that prevents important policies from being enacted. (Council of the European
Union 2017)
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The European External Action Service (EEAS), which carries out the EU’s CFSP, has
established an action plan of disinformation and focuses on how to deal with disinformation both
within the EU and in its neighborhood. Established in 2015, the task force promotes an improved
EU capacity to predict, address, and respond to disinformation from Russia. Efforts to strengthen
the Strategic Communication Task Force of the EEAS are important players in this plan. Other
actions focus on strengthening coordinated and combined responses to disinformation,
mobilizing the private sector to ensure it delivers on its obligations in this field, improving the
resilience of society in response to challenges that disinformation creates. (Europa 2018)
While the EEAS has combated the spread of disinformation in Europe, there is not
enough action being taken. This task force focuses on promoting European values,
particularly in the Eastern Neighborhood, while also identifying and exposing disinformation.
Countries such as Germany and France have established national laws and strategies to reduce
the amount of disinformation that spreads, but the EU needs a common policy that covers all
twenty-seven member states, so they are all equally protected. (Europa 2018)
The CFSP’s weakness is primarily the member states, who are not a collective union, but
rather 27 individual countries. The reason for this is that the national interests of each country
transcend the collective vision for the EU. These member states have different perspectives of
world issues, and their national interests impede their collective approach in international affairs.
This is because while they share common goals being a union, they have their own national
interests which diversified in nature due to the expansive geographical and cultural identities of
Europe. Often when dealing with policy matters and countries with varying interests, member
states do not show their inclination to accept the responsibility, therefore leaving other member
states to bear the burden. (Council of the European Union 2017)
Left in its current state, the CFSP will leave Europe divided, unable to create any foreign
policy due to disagreements and third country loyalty. It will not be possible to pass a strong
policy against Russia with Cyprus, Greece, and Hungary’s current relationship with the EU, and
their voting power in the CFSP. This could have drastic consequences for Europe, which is
facing changing hybrid warfare from Russia almost daily, with challenges such as social media,
news sources, and election fraud that has already happened in elections across Europe. (Hellquist
2016) The EU Member States must either respond to the fundamental challenges that have been
seen above together, or they must shape their futures and policies individually. There is a large
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gap between rhetoric and action that the EU must address before the CFSP can take any strong
actions. (Euractiv 2012)

Case Study
The governments and citizens of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, often referred to as the
Baltic states, see daily Russian strategic information operations and propaganda through news
media and social networks. These are part of campaigns created to undermine trust in the
democratic institutions of the West, while generating social tensions. The final goal is to destroy
confidence in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). There are many Russian speakers
within the Baltic states, due to their history and proximity to Russia. Thirty-five percent of
Latvians speak Russian as their primary language, while almost thirty percent of Estonians speak
the language. Russia aims to pit the Russian-speaking populations in the Baltic region and
Ukraine against their neighbors to divide and ultimately conquer. (Foster 2019)
These countries are vulnerable because of their proximity to Russia, and can see
variations of hybrid, and full-scale hackings and disinformation attacks by Russian operatives.
(Flanagan, et al. 2019) Social media appears to have become Russia’s weapon of choice. The
efforts that support the goals and objectives of the myriad of actors fighting in the large number
of social networks can inform decision making of relevant actors. It is also easily available and
accessible. The act of creating fake accounts to show or implicate support for a figure or idea is
most often used by Russia. This “warfare” is continuously ongoing and is almost impossible to
detect with the current technology that is employed. It is also very difficult to identify the
source, as often this hybrid warfare is occurring from several sources simultaneously. (NATO
2019)
Russia’s intention has three goals with its disinformation propaganda that it shares to the
Baltic States. They begin by describing these states as fascists, who are violent human rights
offenders. They even generate fascist demonstrations, sending in agitators from Russia. They
also portray a nostalgic image of the former Soviet times, arguing that the Baltic government has
been unable to manage their economy or their citizens since becoming independent and
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joining the EU. Lastly, they describe the West and NATO negatively, creating stories of NATO
attacking innocent civilians and arguing that Baltic independence was purely the result of
Western scheming against Russia. (Caryl 2017)
Russia’s news sources, such as Sputnik and RT, are available in these states and play
sponsored information in Russian on a loop. The media sources are primarily aimed at older
generations, who identify more as Russian and may be moved by Russia’s propaganda,
reminding them of the Soviet Era. Russia’s primary goal is to polarize the population. Along
with polarization comes weaker elected officials and instability. (Foster 2019)
After Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, the EU has had concerns that the
Baltic states might become vulnerable to similar hybrid warfare campaigns. These states have
been fighting Russia’s information warfare for over twenty-five years however and know how to
combat these issues. Many experts from the Baltic region have stated that attempting to disprove
everything that has been posted online is not the right thing to do. According to the head of the
Estonian foreign intelligence service, “Russia has been active. The West has been reactive.”
(Caryl 2017) Instead, countries like Estonia and Latvia are strengthening their cyber defenses.
The number of EU citizens who follow news on social media grows year by year, by an
average of 46 percent in 2016. Russia diligently continues with its hybrid war against the EU and
Central and Western Europe as this number rises. The migration crisis of 2015 served as a large
weapon for Russia’s disinformation and interference campaign. Both the magnitude and the
effects of the campaign on Europe’s societies has been unprecedented, reaching the level of
mass-hysteria. This crisis influenced the public’s perception of threat and danger, decreased
support for the EU and the mainstream political parties and politicians, while increasing support
for extreme-right groups and national solutions rather than common European ones. (Nič 2018)
In the 2019 European Union elections, Russian groups used disinformation campaigns
that reduced the voter turnout to change the public opinion. The European Commission and the
bloc’s foreign policy and security team discovered that Russian-linked groups and other nonstate actors had worked hard to discredit the European Union through Facebook, Twitter,
YouTube, and other social networking sites. These media sites claimed to shut down thousands
of bot accounts that were touting anti-EU and NATO rhetoric. (Apuzzo and Satariano 2019)
Social media campaigns like these are common during election seasons. They question
the EU’s democratic legitimacy while increasing the attention of sensitive topics in public
debate.
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such as migration, national sovereignty, and values. The channels and disinformation strategies
that Russia uses depend largely on the country that they are impacting and the target group of
their message. These messages tend to center upon polarizing the community. This attack was
intended to undermine the EU’s legitimacy as a supranational institution, and as a democratic
body. (Chertoff and Rasmussen 2019)
Russia has been known to impact votes in Europe before. In 2016, the “Brexit”
referendum saw high levels of Russian disinformation and interference. The outcome of the vote
was close, with 52 percent of voters in favor of leaving the EU and 48 percent opposed to it. It
was later established, however, that an army of Russian trolls sent thousands of messages and
posts with the hashtag #ReasonsToLeaveEU on the day of Britain's referendum on membership
of the European Union. While many parts of the Brexit referendum are still being investigated,
Russia manipulated social media trends to help influence the growing divide between Britain and
the EU. It is unclear to what extent Russia interfered in the election, but Russia is intent on
creating a divided Europe that has no need for common defense policies. (Kraemer 2020)
In 2017, France’s President Emmanuel Macron was the target of Russian hacking prior to
the election. A week before the final election was to take place, Macron’s campaign announced it
that someone had hacked thousands of emails and private communications., leaking them to the
public. Macron was an independent centrist who was campaigning against the far-right populist
and National Front leader Marine Le Pen. La Pen has enjoyed considerable Russian financial
support and from favorable coverage in state-run Russian media for years. (McAuley 2017)
While Macron won the election, his vows for European unity and collaboration within the EU
were not what Russia wanted to hear, and Le Pen’s divisive racism and xenophobia aligned with
Russia’s goals of dividing Europe. (Wagnsson and Hellman 2018)
Particularly in Eastern Europe, in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, the rise of far-right
and nationalist parties has been in part because of social media campaigns and widespread
racism and xenophobia. In the Czech Republic, a quarter a Czechs trust pro-Kremlin media
sources more than they trust traditional news and media. About forty-eight websites that spread
Russian disinformation are visited over five thousand times a month. (Helmus et al., 2018)
Milos Zeman, the president of the Czech Republic, has spoken out in favor of Russia.
He often compliments President Putin, claiming that the Western states in the EU are looking
to blame Russia with no cause. As the only one of many senior Western politicians, he
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defends the seizure and annexation of Crimea by the regime of Vladimir Putin, and denies
Russian forces in eastern Ukraine, calling for all sanctions to be lifted. (Gilles 2019) Mr. Zeman
was only narrowly reelected in 2018, with his opponent’s campaign promise of “reaffirming ties
to the west” was subject to many interference and disinformation campaigns. Mr. Zeman also
received large amounts of money during his campaign from an undisclosed source, which Zeman
himself claimed could “quite possible be Russia.” (Editorial Board 2018)
Russia sees Slovakia as the only Visegrad country that could conceivably leave NATO,
so they are focusing their attention there. In Central and Eastern Slovakia, support for NATO is
only at 50%. Slovakia proved to be the most pro-Russian, followed by Hungary and the Czech
Republic. In Slovakia, 28% of the population had positive sentiments towards Russia, directly
correlated to the Russia-related news that is disproportionally covered by pro-Russian
disinformation sites. This number is also because of the far-right and paramilitary groups that
reminisce on the historic ties between the two countries and want to see these ties restored.
Russia uses nostalgia of the Communist Soviet past to promote their own narratives, through
their own news sources and social media. (Caryl 2017)
The main purpose of Russia’s disinformation campaigns and hybrid warfare across
Europe is to undermine its opponents, in this case the EU. Rather than promoting Russia and
Russian ideals, the Kremlin seeks to gradually decompose the institutional framework and
democratic integrity of Europe. In both Central and eastern Europe, the target of these attacks
has been NATO and the EU, and Russia often depicts itself as the only rational actor. They
portray themselves as being the unrecognized or misunderstood peacemaker, and often the
necessary savior that is desperately needed in global politics today. (Chivvis 2017)
Russia uses social media networks to their benefit, as they can bypass the traditional
media sources and have a direct influence on public opinion. They can promote fake, radical
news stories that support their position of being the strongest and only rational actor in the global
political arena. By polarizing the EU, Russia has a stronger chance of implementing its influence
into these communities. Eventually, the goal is to have global influence over a de-united Europe
and become the acting hegemon. (Gilles 2019)

Conclusion
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Europe’s Common Foreign Security Policy was created intending to combat threats to
Europe’s peace and democracy. When the EU needs it most, however, it is not useful, and can
barely be implemented. The Common Foreign Security Policy must change to address the
changing hybrid threats that the EU sees today. As Russia adapts to changing technology and
online platforms, using social media networks to question the EU’s democratic legitimacy, the
EU must also adapt, or it will leave Europe divided, with no security policy to protect it.
The EEAs task force focuses on countering disinformation, but it does not expand further
to take direct action against Russia or get ahead of the problem. Many Eastern European
countries, like Estonia, have been so successful in warding off Russia’s relentless hacking
because they are one step ahead. The European External Action Service’s action plan to combat
disinformation is a step in the right direction, but there must be more action taken to face the
inevitable interference that will happen.
Russia’s disinformation and interference campaigns have one aim- to polarize the
communities in which they target. By constantly being behind and attempting to disprove post
after post, there is no hope in combatting Russia’s massive disinformation platform. In Eastern
Europe, the goal is to cause divisiveness between native Russian speakers and those who aren’t,
while constantly inundating the citizens with anti- NATO and European Union propaganda. The
only way to truly combat this is to get ahead and know how to block the bots and channels of
disinformation strategies. In Central and Western Europe, Russia aims to polarize by supporting
far right and nationalist parties that challenge the EU’s democratic values. (Chivvis 2017)
While they vary in extent and value, Russia’s disinformation campaigns over the past
ten years have grown exponentially, adapting to rapidly changing technology. This demonstrates
Russia’s intent to create a Europe that is so divided that a common security policy will not be
necessary, as there will not be a common Europe in which to create policy around. Europe’s
security has already been impacted through the recent elections at the EU level, and the
referendum held in the UK.
Having seen a rise in nationalist and far right parties across the European Union,
disinformation campaigns work, regardless if they are true. This seems to be Russia’s goal—to
create a polarized Europe that has no means of protecting itself, thus allowing Russia to increase
its influence and power. If the EU does not have an active and hybrid Common Foreign Security
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Policy, this may become a reality—without the European Union adapting to the technological
changes happening around it, there will be consequences.
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